Principle 6

Occasionally, people receive some award, honour, or position that enhances their status or rank in a workplace, community, or society.  They might receive a prize or secure a position on a board, for example.  Because of this increase in status or rank, they might then receive other awards, roles, or opportunities.   Therefore, a modest increase in status, sometimes emanating from a fortuitous award or an unfair procedure, may culminate in a fortunate cycle of additional benefits.  After people observe this cycle of rewards, they recognise the pronounced, and sometimes undeserved, benefits that status and rank can afford.  In these circumstances

• the primary motivation of many individuals is thus to increase their status rather than to develop their skills, qualities, and relationships,
• and this intense motivation to achieve status tends to manifest as narcissism—a quality that often coincides with aggressive outbursts, corrupt behaviour, and many other unpleasant consequences.

So, to contain narcissism, organisations and governments somehow need to diminish the extent to which a modest increase in status culminates in a fortunate cycle of additional benefits.  That is, in some circumstances, individuals or organisations attract status or rewards that are disproportional—significantly greater than comparable individuals or organisations would have attracted.  In these circumstances, governments may need to offset these disproportional rewards.  They could, for example

• impose a windfall tax in response to excessive profits—an initiative that might seem progressive today but was embraced by Margaret Thatcher and other conservative governments in the past,
• oblige companies to disclose the ratio of CEO remuneration over staff remuneration—and perhaps instill some penalty if the ratio is excessive,
• impose fines that are proportional to income, as observed in Finland,
• diminish the degree to which companies and unions can donate to political parties, as observed in Canada,
• split huge companies to prevent oligopolies—similar to the attempt in the US to split the Microsoft operating systems from all other operations—ultimately to encourage competition and investment into productivity.

Rather than offset these disproportional rewards, leaders could instead attempt to enhance the influence and power of individuals who are not high in status—potentially diminishing the obsession with status.  For example

• leaders should deliberately offer reserved or modest workers more opportunities to express themselves—in meetings, in the media, or in other forums,
• bodies that offer grants or other funds, such as governments, could utilise more lotteries to distribute these funds, diminishing the degree to which a few prominent stakeholders can conquer the market,
• media outlets, including social media sites, should prioritise the voices of humble and thus trusted sources rather than individuals or organisations that are high in status but often biased.

Finally, organisations should cultivate a culture in which the practices of individuals do not vary appreciably with status or rank.  For example,

• in many schools, students or even teachers, rather than custodians, clean the school—often regarded in Japan as an opportunity to impart respect, responsibility, and equality,
• in some progressive organisations, leaders often attempt the tasks their staff complete—a practice that has been shown to enhance the capacity of these leaders to accommodate and to evaluate these staff effectively.

These attempts to limit the excessive benefits of modest awards could significantly dent the level of narcissism that pervades society today.  

Background

In many settings, increases in status often ignite further increases in status. To illustrate, a person who receives one prize, even fortuitously or unfairly, is more likely to receive other prizes as a consequence, potentially culminating in a cycle of success. Many people, aware of this potential cycle of success, become obsessed with their status, power, and significance, fuelling narcissism throughout society.

Lobbying is an archetypal example of this dynamic (for a review, see Lacy-Nichols, Johnson, et al., 2023). To illustrate, some people, perhaps because of their political skills, previous contacts, or other fortuitous events, may become a senior political advisor. Two years later, after they vacate this role, these individuals could attract hefty sums of money to act as a lobbyist, communicating with public officials and influencing political decision-makers, perhaps on behalf of multiple clients.

Yet, many lobbyists are granted enviable, and perhaps undemocratic, levels of power and influence.  Lobbyists, especially if they represent only the organisation in which they are employed, do not need to register or disclose who they met, what they discussed, and how they benefited from these meetings. Because of their power, they can stifle changes that most of the public espouse, such as a ban on gambling advertisements (Johnson & Livingstone, 2021; Lacy-Nichols Christie, et al., 2023; for a case study in the tobacco industry, see Watts et al., 2023).s to limit the excessive benefits of modest awards could significantly dent the level of narcissism that pervades society today.  

Solutions that are often recommended

Commentators and scholars, across the political spectrum, have advocated a range of initiatives to limit the power of lobbyists.  To illustrate, commentators and scholars have proposed that, in Australia for instance

• like third-party lobbyists who represent other clients, in-house lobbyists who represent the organisation in which they are employed should also register as lobbyists and thus comply with the relevant code of conduct before they receive access passes (Lacy-Nichols, Christie, et al., 2023),
• each lobby firm, lobbyist, and client should be assigned a unique identifier to help compare and analyse data across registers and jurisdictions (Lacy-Nichols Christie, et al., 2023),
• such changes should be applied and unified across federal, state, and local governments,
• former ministers, senior advisors, or senior public servants should not be permitted to operate as lobbyists for an extended period, such as five years, after they vacate these roles (Tham, 2019),
• lobbyists must declare all past employment, relevant associations, access passes, and sponsors to monitor conflicts of interest (cf Hobbs, 2020),
• both lobbyists and public officials, such as ministers, should be obliged to report and to disclose the main topic of their meetings, including informal meetings, in a platform that members of the media and public can access,
• these disclosures should be embedded in other instruments of accountability, such as disclosure of political contributions and spending (Tham, 2019)
• the government should direct enough funding and authority to an independent regulator or bipartisan committee who can dispense severe penalties, such as fines or lengthy suspensions, in response to violations of codes,
• this body should impose mandatory training on lobbyists, and perhaps even public officials, about the code of conduct around lobbying (Tham, 2019).

Potential challenges

Although other nations, such as Canada and Ireland, have introduced many useful provisions (Chari, 2024; Lacy-Nichols, Baradar, et al., 2025), similar initiatives could ignite a range of complications.  For example

• these initiatives may impose a significant administrative burden on smaller organisations—and, thus, may amplify the domination of larger stakeholders,
• these changes may impede lobbying in general and thus nullify the benefits of lobbying, such as democratic participation and the exchange of useful information,
• these policies, if too onerous, may incite clandestine lobbying,
• excessive disclosure may impede legitimate concerns around privacy and confidentiality,
• these changes may be too costly to implement.

Innovative solutions

These challenges, however, should not preclude some amendments to existing practices but do suggest that perhaps more innovative solutions should be considered. Furthermore, these solutions should conform to the other principles of radical humility, such as the principle to seek modest gains incrementally over colossal gains suddenly.  One possible solution combines two initiatives: a disclosure portal and a transparency score.  To explain the disclosure portal

• to arrange meetings with public officials, such as ministers, lobbyists must enter relevant information into an online portal—information that includes the client these lobbyists represent, the topic of discussion, and the goals they want to achieve,
• meeting cannot be arranged until this information is submitted,
• whenever possible, discussions between lobbyists and public officials should be recorded—and these recordings should be retained until generative AI can summarise the discussion,
• after AI summarises the discussion, lobbyists can voluntarily delete some of this content as well as insert additional details, such as conflicts of interest,
• the information that lobbyists enter into this online portal as well as the summaries of discussions should be accessible to the public, including the media.

To motivate individuals to utilise this portal appropriately, each lobbyist should be assigned a transparency score.  To demonstrate

• this transparency score should be slashed whenever lobbyists delete content from the meeting summaries or whenever audits reveal these lobbyists have breached the code of conduct,
• this transparency score should be raised whenever lobbyists insert relevant materials into their summaries, attend relevant training, or disclose other useful information,
• a relevant body could uncover incentives that reward these increases in transparency scores;
• for example, if the transparency score exceeds some criterion, the registration fee of these lobbyists or the likelihood these individuals will be audited could be decreased.

Case study: An initiative to regulate personalised, dynamic pricing algorithms sensitively

Introduction to personalised, dynamic pricing algorithms

Did you know that two people who want to purchase the same item at the same time, such as an airline ticket or hotel room, may be quoted different prices?  That is, many organisations deploy a range of algorithms, often guided by AI, to estimate the price that people may be willing to pay for an item (for examples, see Albert & Goldenberg, 2022; Buchholz et al., 2025).  To estimate this price, the algorithm may integrate diverse considerations, such as the purchase history, postcode, intelligence, and appearance of users as well as battery percentage and browser type. 

Once organisations estimate the price that people may be willing to pay for an item, they will typically charge this price—to maximise their revenue.  Consequently, prices may vary significantly across individuals and demographics.  For example, Tinder appears to charge users who are over 30 significantly more than users who are under 30 (Zealand, 2021).

Benefits of personalised, dynamic pricing algorithms

These pricing algorithms can benefit various segments of society (for a review, see Seele et al., 2021). For example,

• organisations sometimes charge inadequate prices—prices that are lower than consumers are willing to pay,
• pricing algorithms overcome this problem and can thus increase the profitability of businesses (see Dubé & Misra, 2023; Fisher et al., 2018).

Likewise, individuals who receive a limited income may often be unable to afford specific goods and services.  The pricing algorithms may diminish the amounts these individuals are charged, benefiting people who otherwise could not afford these goods or services (for examples, see Dubé & Misra, 2023; Lichtenberg, 2011).

Concerns around personalised, dynamic pricing algorithms

Despite their benefits, pricing algorithms have sparked considerable controversy as well. For example, some consumers perceive these algorithms as unfair and discriminatory (Heidary et al., 2024). In addition, these algorithms may violate privacy laws in many jurisdictions, such as the General Data Protection Regulation in the European Union, in which personal data cannot be used without the consent of consumers (Hutchinson & Treščáková, 2022).

More disconcertingly, even lawful pricing algorithms could significantly be detrimental to society.  For example, in some sectors, individuals who attract a higher income might be charged lower prices.

To illustrate,

• the algorithm may recognise that wealthier individuals can afford a more diverse range of goods and services,
• therefore, to prevent these individuals from purchasing these alternatives, wealthier people may tend to be charged less,
• in these circumstances, pricing algorithms benefit wealthy individuals and disadvantage underprivileged individuals—amplifying the inequalities in society,
• these inequalities diverge from egalitarian values—the values that otherwise tend to stem narcissism and entitlement.

Many other reasons suggest that pricing algorithms might increase the price that underprivileged individuals need to pay.  For example,

• when the battery of a computer is almost depleted, pricing algorithms are likely to increase the price to consumers—because people often feel rushed in these circumstances (see this example),
• this algorithm is thus likely to benefit wealthier individuals, whose battery life tends to be longer.

In short, pricing algorithms could disadvantage underprivileged individuals, such as impoverished villages or recent immigrants. Admittedly, some nations have introduced laws that may protect some demographics. For example, to comply with Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, European organisations cannot vary price across specific demographics, such as sex, race, religion, disability, and age.  However, pricing algorithms that, for example, depend only on purchase history and battery percentage, for example, might inadvertently, and perhaps lawfully, disadvantage specific demographics.

A simple initiative

Fortunately, a simple initiative could prevent, or at least contain, this discrimination.  Specifically

• organisations that utilise pricing algorithms must collect data on the postcode in which their customers live,
• organisations could then download an app that converts this postcode to the median income of residents—a statistic that can be used to estimate the income of each customer,
• organisations could then utilise another app to calculate, and then report, the correlation between the estimated income of clients and the prices they were charged.  

Positive correlations suggest the organisations had, even if inadvertently, raised the price for underprivileged individuals.  To limit this behaviour, governments could revoke the right of these organisations to utilise pricing algorithms for a specific duration.  The duration of this suspension could depend on the size of these correlations (for complementary anti-discrimination laws, see Bock, 2016).

Admittedly, governments may still need to manage other concerns around pricing algorithms, such as the objection that such algorithms are seldom disclosed.  To address these concerns, for example, organisations could be obliged to disclose their use of these algorithms—and may perhaps need to offer customers the option to choose an alternative platform that offers static prices (e.g., Botta & Wiedemann, 2020).