Radical Humility

Principle 8

Uncover opportunities to empower, and to relinquish power, now to attract support later

Overview

Perhaps unsurprisingly, people like to maintain control over their decisions and actions.  For example, when playing a game of chance, they like to roll the dice themselves, as if they can roll better than anyone else.  Similarly, they tend to prefer the appearance of Ikea furniture they have constructed themselves to the same furniture that someone else constructed, called the IKEA effect.

Similar inclinations pervade workplaces.  For example, leaders are often reluctant to delegate tasks to other people, such as inexperienced staff.  The problem, however, is that

  • leaders tend to underestimate the capacity of their staff to change and to develop over time,
  • their teams, therefore, do not develop skills and capabilities as rapidly or as extensively as do their rivals,
  • in contrast, when leaders empower their staff, these teams tend to trust one another, perform effectively, and demonstrate great innovation. 

Workplaces thrive not only when leaders delegate tasks but also when leaders relinquish equity.  For example

  • since the advent of employee ownership share plans, studies reveal that companies that offer employees shares in the company tend to attract more value to their shareholders,
  • indeed, Ownership Works, an organisation that faciltates these schemes, has collated many case studies of companies in which financial performance escalated after these plans were introduced.

Rather than distributing money to empower people, organisations and governments can also distribute time.   For example, in many nations, individuals need to record their attempts to seek work or to develop their capabilities to receive unemployment benefits.  Yet, as considerable evidence shows, these activities consume significant time and actually diminish the likelihood that individuals will secure work or develop a small business. 

This mindset, in which leaders strive to relinquish some control now to enhance performance later, can significantly enhance the efficiency of organisations and sectors.  One telling illustration revolves around multi-organisation schools:

  • Although the precise configuration varies across nations, in general, a multi-organisation school is a formal network, usually comprising between 100 and 100 schools.
  • To assist each principal, a single executive team govern the entire network of schools.
  • The network of schools can thus share resources, management practices, and many other procedures.
  • These formalised networks are especially effective when the schools share a philosophy but are located in diverse regions.

Example: Initiatives to stem pork barrelling

Between 2016 and 2022, the Commonwealth Government implemented the Building Better Regions Fund—an initiative to support infrastructure and other projects that facilitate the development of regional communities.  During this time, the responsible minister chose 49 grant recipients that had been rejected by the department (Wood et al., 2022b).  Furthermore, the majority of these projects were approved a short time before forthcoming elections (Wood et al., 2022b). 

Many commentators believe that some of these decisions may demonstrate pork-barrelling: the tendency of governments to use public money, often grants, to attract particular voters.  Specifically, to attract votes,

  • governments, across the spectrum, often award discretionary grants to projects in marginal seats.
  • indeed, some research estimates that about 70% of these projects are relevant to marginal seats,
  • governments also reward electorates that chose their party—partly to reinforce the preferences of these voters in future elections,
  • to illustrate, twice as many Commonwealth discretionary grants are awarded to electorates in which the seat is occupied by the incumbent government instead of the opposition (Wood et al., 2022b).

Governments sometimes argue this pork-barrelling is insignificant and indeed necessary.  The problem, however, is that, whenever governments perpetrate this pork-barrelling

  • they squander funds—because this money is directed to projects that do not generate the best returns to the nation,
  • they undermine trust in governments, diminishing the likelihood that voters will embrace future reforms that are contentious but significant to the country,
  • they compromise the credibility and reputation of Australia, partly explaining the observation that Australia has plummeted since 2000 on the Transparent International Corruption Perception Index,
  • they promote and embed a culture that tolerates corruption.

Past attempts to limit pork-barrelling have, in general, been unsuccessful.   To illustrate,

  • the Commonwealth Grant Rules as well as the Public Governance and Performance Accountability Act 2013 discourage the improper use of public money, such as pork-barrelling, but do not impose strict penalties in response to this behaviour,
  • Ministerial Standards also preclude this improper use of public money—but prime ministers or premiers are granted discretion on whether to enforce these standards and, for political purposes, frequently overlook some indiscretions.

Partial solution

To diminish the incidence of pork-barrelling, the Grattan Institute (Wood et al., 2022b) recommends that

  • the minister defines the purpose of a grant program and may approve the key selection criteria—but cannot intervene during the selection of grant recipients,
  • instead, a department or agency apply these key selection criteria to evaluate grants applicants,
  • these ratings should be accessible to an Audit Office or to anyone who lodges an FOI application,
  • if dissatisfied with which individuals or organisations that receive these grants, the minister can only update and republish the key selection criteria or encourage other candidates to apply,
  • many other measures should also be considered, such as multi-party standing committee that oversee discretionary grants as well as rules around which grant programs must be transparent and available to anyone.

At first glance, readers may cynically assume that government ministers would never want to relinquish the right to intervene during the selection of grant recipients.  However, humble politicians would agree to these recommendations, because this initiative may relinquish some of their power and influence now but will attract the trust and support they need to implement more contentious initiatives later. 

Example: Ongoing funding to support community hubs

To assist communities around the nation, governments will often allocate community grants.  To illustrate, after a flood, fire, or another natural disaster, governments might distribute funds to assist emergency services, to improve mass communication, and to dispense food or other critical resources. These grants are temporary and fund specific activities. 

For several reasons, these temporary and inflexible grants do not significantly help communities respond efficiently to crises and disasters.  Specifically, as Dadich, Townley, and Grace (2025) outlined in a report entitled “Building resilient Australian communities”, communities tend to respond more swiftly and effectively when

  • members of the community have established trusted social networks—because people who feel socially isolated seldom receive the guidance and resources they need to manage crises,
  • members of the community know how to access the range of services that are available,
  • individuals have developed the capacity and motivation to assist other members of the community, such as offer services that diminish trauma, when needed.

Temporary and inflexible grants may not help communities develop these qualities.  Instead, to achieve these goals, communities need to develop effective community hubs—physical or virtual spaces that coordinate the range of community services that are available.  A typical community hub, according to Dadich, Townley, and Grace (2025) from the University of Western Sydney, might comprise the following features:

  • the hub might be a community centre that is staffed by a few people, such as a manager, event manager, and executive officer,
  • when members of the community experience a problem, from broken appliances to domestic violence, they visit the hub—and the hub can then refer these individuals to the appropriate services,
  • the hub organises activities that accommodate local needs and promote social cohesion, such as breakfasts, gardening, arts, cultural activities, communal meals, playgroups, and training,
  • the hub also arranges practices that encourage members to offer services as well, such as training, timebanks, or local exchange trading systems,
  • to earn a social licence, the hub embraces practices that foster trust in the community, such extensive consultation and transparent decisions.

To facilitate the development of effective hubs, governments should

  • dispense ongoing funding to communities—contingent only upon suitable governance—and enable communities to decide how to use these funds within broad guidelines,
  • establish a peak body—perhaps derived from existing community service associations—that offer guidelines or resources that enable these hubs to seek funding, to liaise with government departments, to coordinate the various services, and to govern as well as to manage the centre effectively.

Governments that provide ongoing funding, rather than temporary grants, to community hubs relinquish some control over how this money is utilised.  However, the benefit of this approach is that

  • members are more likely to perceive these hubs as enduring rather than transient—and the corresponding sense of continuity tends to increase the likelihood that individuals will sacrifice their immediate needs to improve the future of their community (see this webpage),
  • members are more likely to feel a sense of ownership over the hub—and this sense of ownership encourages members to dedicate their efforts to improve the hub (e.g., O’Driscoll et al., 2006).

Hence, empowerment of communities, coupled with appropriate guidance, may enable these hubs to prepare and to respond more effectively to crises.

Example: Annuities in Australia

To encourage individuals to relinquish some of their power now, ultimately to attract support or resources later, governments may need to consider a range of initiatives.  One example revolves around annuities.  Many commentators suggest, and many studies demonstrate, that lifetime annuities may improve the lives of retirees (for a review, see Coates et al., 2025).  The rationale is that

  • a funding body—such as an insurance company or government agency—pools the funds of many retirees,
  • depending on the amount of money that a person invests in this scheme, the individual receives a guaranteed income, such as $50 000 every year, regardless of how long they live.

Instead of annuities, in Australia, over 80% of retirees who have accrued superannuation utilise account-based pensions in which they withdraw regular amounts of money from their superannuation and can also withdraw larger sums when needed.  Relative to annuities, however, the drawback of these account-based pensions is that

  • individuals tend to withdraw a limited amount of money, usually the prescribed minimum, because they are concerned about various risks, such as living significantly longer than expected, rises in inflation, or collapses in the equity market,
  • consequently, most retirees utilise only a portion of their superannuation, diminishing their living standards,
  • these uncertainties also provoke stress, anxiety, and uncertainty,
  • because of tax regulations—such as the regulation that all income from account-based pensions but only 60% of income from annuities is included in the Age Pension means test—this approach diminishes the funds individuals may receive from a pension.

Annuities address these problems.  The only drawback of annuities is that

  • individuals cannot as readily withdraw large sums when needed or shift to another provider, diminishing flexibility,
  • individuals often do not understand annuities and, therefore, may be suspicious of these offers,
  • individuals may be concerned the provider may collapse (e.g., Beshears et al., 2014).

To overcome these concerns, the Grattan Institute, in their report entitled Simpler Super, recommend that

  • whenever possible, the government should recommend that retirees utilise 80% of any of their superannuation funds that exceed $250 000 to purchase annuities,
  • however, the government should indicate that other alternatives, such as annuity incomes that depend on investments or the mortality of other members, could be considered too,
  • rather than depend on insurance companies, few of which now offer lifetime annuities in Australia, the government should fund these annuities, but an independent Commonwealth agency should manage these annuities.

As research implies, when the government funds annuities, retirees are more inclined to embrace this option.  That is, they are more willing to relinquish some control or power over their funds to generate a more consistent and stable return over their lifetime.    

Other relevant policies, such as the Retirement Income Covenant, have not encouraged annuities to a sufficient extent.  Financial advisors do not often recommend annuities, partly because they may forgo the fees they would otherwise charge to manage the capital of retirees.  

Example: Electronic secondary consultation

Australians often need to pay lots of money to receive the necessary healthcare.  Consumers pay about 17% of the money that is invested in healthcare—higher than most other similar nations (Duckett et al., 2022). Since 2010, the average costs that Australians must pay to visit a specialist in private healthcare has risen by 73%, even after deducing insurance and controlling inflation.  Consequently, many patients, especially if their income is modest, need to either

  • sacrifice their needs to pay these specialists, such as seek financial aid or purchase less food (Robins et al., 2025),
  • wait, often more than 30 days for urgent referrals and more than a year for other referrals, to arrange specialist care from a public clinic.

Because of these long wait lists, patients often become more gravely ill.  The costs of healthcare surges as a consequence (James et al., 2024). 

A partial solution

To partly address these concerns, the Grattan Institute, in a report entitled “Special treatment: Improving Australians’ access to specialist care”, has recommended a compelling initiative that diminishes the number of referrals to specialists (Breadon et al., 2025).  Specifically, according to this proposal

  • before referring a patient to a specialist, a GP may utilise an online platform in which they enter a clinical question together with relevant information about a patient,
  • within a specific time, such as a week, a relevant specialist, employed at a hospital to address these questions, offers a recommendation,
  • the GPs and specialists are compensated fairly to utilise this platform,
  • to guarantee quality, responses are monitored over time.

Similar programs have been implemented in many nations and states, including regions in Canada and Queensland.  Most states are attempting to develop comparable platforms.  Initial results indicate that, when this platform is utilised

  • the GP can manage over 60% of cases that would otherwise be referred to a specialist,
  • therefore, in Australia, this initiative might diminish the number of referrals by about 60 000 a year, saving patients about $4 million,
  • the approach would cost about $26 million a year—but significantly improve healthcare and diminish the costs of unnecessary referrals.

Despite these promising results, to extend these services to all regions in Australia, governments will need to intervene. For example, the federal government, in collaboration with clinical bodies, should establish the standards the GPs and specialists should observe.  State governments should select which hospitals could engage these specialists, procure the appropriate digital platform, evaluate performance, fund these services to reward performance, and help primary health networks recruit GPs. 

If this initiative is implemented, specialists will relinquish some of their services to the GP.  Yet, this approach benefits specialists too because

  • this initiative may uncover instances in which patients do need to visit specialists but might not have been referred otherwise—estimated to be about 4700 patients a year (Breadon et al., 2025),
  • the health system may become more efficient, accruing savings that could be invested in advances in equipment and resources.